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D

uff R. Waring argues that, in some
instances, psychotherapy should be
viewed as healing (or alleviating) mental
disorders and also as cultivating good character
in patients (Waring 2012). In these instances,
psychotherapists should understand their patients
as having character faults that are manifested as
mental disorders, as having nascent virtues they
can build on during therapy, and as moving toward goals that can be specified in terms of both
improved mental health and greater moral virtue.
Waring’s discussion is deeply illuminating, but it
suffers from a major difficulty: the failure to take
adequate account of the differences between the
perspectives of third-party observers of therapy
and of psychotherapists as participants in therapy.
Waring uses the example of a thirty-five-yearold man with a serious anger management problem. The man simmers with hostility, periodically
erupts in violence at slight provocation, has obsessive thoughts of hitting others and being hit, feels
persecuted by the world, takes great offense at minor slights, drinks to excess, and is twice divorced
by women who became alarmed at his drinking
and violence. The man feels shame and guilt
about his behavior, and he suffers from chronic
© 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

self-loathing and episodic depression. According
to Waring, the man displays both mental disorders
and moral flaws, both personality disorders and
character faults. Moreover, the same patterns of
behavior, emotions, and thinking are evidence for
both the mental disorders and the moral flaws. In
terms of mental disorders, he might fit the criteria
(depending on further details) for Antisocial Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder,
Impulse Control Disorder, Substance Abuse Disorder, and some type of Depressive Disorder. In
terms of morality, we can say he lacks the virtues
of self-respect, self-love, self-control, empathy,
respect for others, and responsibility.
Likewise, the aims of therapy can be specified as simultaneously moral and mental health
matters. In terms of mental health, the goals are
to remove or alleviate his mental disorder and,
more positively, to help him improve his skills in
controlling his anger (and drinking), to increase
his self-esteem, to improve his ability to relate
with other people, and to exercise greater personal
autonomy. In terms of morality, the goals center
on moral self-development by increasing his selfcontrol over his anger and drinking, his self-respect
and self-love, his capacities for empathy and his
ability to respect others, and his acting with greater
moral responsibility.
Finally, the process of moving from problems
to goals is a shared therapeutic activity that builds
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on and expands the patient’s autonomy, and simultaneously a shared moral endeavor that builds on
and improves the patient’s nascent virtues in the
direction of greater virtue. In understanding this
process and its aims, we need a theory of virtue
ethics that is psychologically realistic, especially
in understanding moral goals in terms of what is
morally satisfactory rather than ideally good, and
that celebrates moral diversity in how the virtues
are implemented in good lives. To this end, Waring
invokes and insightfully applies Christine Swanton’s ethical theory (Swanton 2003).
Waring is recommending what I call an integrated moral–therapeutic perspective: morality and
psychotherapy are overlapping and interwoven
rather than mutually exclusive (Martin 2006). In
particular, the same features of the man’s behavior,
emotions, and cognition can be viewed through
the lenses of health and morality. The situation
is in some respects like looking at the familiar
duck–rabbit drawing so as to see it as a duck or
as a rabbit. For example, just as the same dot in
the drawing can be seen as the eye of a duck or
the eye of a rabbit, so the man’s violence can be
seen as part of a moral fault or mental disorder.
Again, just as the two interpretations of the dot are
semantically connected via “eye,” the moral and
health perspectives have some direct overlaps; for
example, the terms “self-respect,” “self-esteem,”
and “self-love” all convey both healthy and morally appropriate self-regard.
Waring’s Janus-faced vision (to switch metaphors) is far too rich to be worked out in a single
essay. Not surprising, his essay leaves open a
great many details about how morality and
mental health perspectives fit together, including
exactly how many types of cases he would apply
his outlook to. He also blurs the issue in places,
as when he invokes Louis C. Charland to support
his approach. Charland claims that Antisocial,
Borderline, Histrionic, and Narcissistic Personality
Disorders are “moral and not medical” matters,
and he challenges whether psychotherapists have
any special expertise in dealing with them (Charland 2004, 71). This is not Waring’s view, as I
understand him, for he seeks to dissolve Charlandtype dichotomies.

I see one large gap in Waring’s discussion. In my
view, he is insufficiently sensitive to the complications in applying his integrated moral–therapeutic
perspective to the special role of psychotherapists.
Much of his discussion fits how third-person observers might reasonably think about psychotherapy. Psychotherapists, however, are not observers.
They are participants. They are also professionals
who have special roles and responsibilities that
center more directly on healing rather than moral
cultivation (even though, again, I agree that their
work has both implications). This role modifies
and restricts how they employ the virtue–ethics
language that is appropriate for observers.
We need not return to myths of “value-neutral
therapy” to appreciate that some explicit uses of
moral language are inappropriate during therapy,
or at least during some stages of therapy. Imagine
a psychotherapist saying to a patient: “You have
several very serious character faults or vices.
You lack the virtues of self-control, self-respect,
empathy, and respect for other people. You feel
guilt and shame because you actually are guilty
and shameful in your conduct. We need to work
together to help you become a morally better person. One of my contributions will be to educate
you about morally appropriate ways of thinking,
feeling, and behaving. Working together, we can
improve your character.”
Although such language might be suitable for a
third-person observer, it might be therapeutically
self-defeating for psychotherapists to use. It might
also be morally self-defeating, insofar as the therapy contributes indirectly to moral improvement.
Therapists need to establish and maintain a caring, supportive, autonomy-respecting relationship
with patients, which can be more important than
the specific techniques and theories they employ
(Frank and Frank 1991, 40–3). To maintain that
relationship, therapists are trained to be largely
nonjudgmental. Doing so often requires avoiding
the language of vices and faults, which can push
psychodynamic buttons that interfere with the
relationship.
At one point, Waring might seem to touch on
the issue I am raising. In a footnote, he distinguishes between encouraging a patient to accept
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responsibility for changing a moral disorder
(future-oriented responsibility) versus blaming
them for being responsible for causing and having
the disorder (past-oriented responsibility). In doing so, he notes that a patient might not be fully
blameworthy for causing the disorder, and instead
the patient’s specific disorder and failed moral
vision might be attributable to bad upbringing.
Yet my concern is different. Even if patients are
blameworthy by an observer for the origin and
manifestations of their violent behavior, the special
role of the therapist typically requires avoiding
blame—to help. The same, I might add, can be
said of friends, lovers, and spouses in providing
support.
I am not suggesting that explicit moral language
is never appropriate during therapy. I am only saying that the moral language appropriate for thirdperson observers needs to be filtered through the
prism of therapy. Positive moral language might be
quite appropriate in promoting therapeutic goals,
as when therapists convey hope about the future,
praise patients for their courage and for accepting responsibility, and urge patients to love and
respect themselves. Of course, much depends on
nuance and context, and therapists are trained to
be attuned to how patients can misinterpret even
positive moral language. Exactly when virtue–ethics talk is therapeutically helpful during therapy,
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and when it is best left for third-party observers,
needs to be studied empirically.
Finally, it might be objected that in contrasting
the perspectives of psychotherapists with those of
third parties I have neglected what most interests
Waring: the perspective of the patient. In reply,
although Waring says he is interested in “the efforts that patients make,” he is equally interested
in “a concerted effort by the therapist and patient
to replace character faults with character strengths
or virtues.” If anything, the objection raises further questions about whether Waring intends for
therapists or patients to initiate moral language.
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